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27 August 1966

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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FRENCH SOMALILAND RED SEA Ma<u>ęc</u>aua YEMEN ARTOUM GULF OF ADEN FRENCH DIBOUT បiredawa ADDIS ABABA SOMALIZ E T HUI P 0 DEN *INDIAN* OCEAN. KENYA

French Somaliland: Anti-French demonstrations in Djibouti, prompted by President de Gaulle's visit, suggest that Paris may face increasing pressures for independence.

Nationalist agitation in French Somaliland has been carefully curbed by the French in recent years and has declined since the death of the most prominent nationalist leader in 1960. The most significant nationalist activity in recent years has stemmed from exiles in refuge in neighboring Somali Republic who spread propaganda and make appearances before the UN and African organizations. The government of the republic fears Paris will eventually permit French Somaliland to come under Ethiopian control. (See Map)

French Somaliland, at present an autonomous

Overseas Territory, in 1958 voted to remain a member
of the French Community. De Gaulle, during his visit,
has reiterated his "respect" for that decision and is unlikely to bow to nationalist pressure. Djibouti is an important port and terminus for the French-run FrancoEthiopian railroad. The territory's strategic importance
to France is probably increasing with the upcoming departure of Britain from Aden. France has about 3,000
troops and small naval and air forces in Djibouti? Franck

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NOTES

Nigeria: Several reports point to a possible early reaction by extremist Ibo elements against the northerners now dominating the Lagos junta. Continued harassment of Ibos by undisciplined northern army elements is increasing the chance of retaliatory action by the Ibos. This might include attempts to assassinate Supreme Commander Gowon and other selected northern officers, which would deepen tribal hatreds and abort the projected interregional negotiations. 7

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Special Assistants to the President

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

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